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The commencement of the trial of charles taylor, the former president of Liberia charged with international crimes by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, was to be a 
momentous occasion. It was billed as a rare moment of interna-
tional accountability, with a former head of state facing trial on 
eleven charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for 
his alleged criminal assistance to rebel forces in Sierra Leone. 
The trial was moved from the Special Court’s site in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone to The Hague, Netherlands, for security reasons. 
But when the prosecution’s opening statement commenced as 
scheduled on June 4, 2007, the accused was not in the court-
room. Presiding Justice Julia Sebutinde, a British-trained judge 
from Uganda, immediately took note of the defendant’s absence 
but proceeded to recognize the other relevant actors in the court-
room. They included a prosecution team of seven lawyers, the 
defendant’s assigned counsel, Karim Khan, and Duty Counsel 
from the Office of the Principal Defender Charles Jalloh. Khan 
had been assigned to represent Taylor more than a year before 
because Taylor was determined to be “partially indigent,” mean-
ing that he was without sufficient funds to hire counsel, but that 
if assets were recovered, he would be required to contribute to 
the costs of counsel. 
The focus of the hearing quickly moved from the prosecu-
tion’s opening statement to the defendant’s absence. The day 
became a protracted standoff between the judges and defense 
counsel, with a scenario that culminated in Khan leaving the 
courtroom despite the threat of contempt of court. This short 
article examines the Taylor trial skirmish over defense counsel 
and its aftermath as a paradigmatic example of the ongoing 
struggle to define rules and structures to protect the indepen-
dence of defense counsel, and the defense office in general, 
in international criminal tribunals. In addition to the work of 
defense counsel in the Sierra Leone tribunal, this article also 
will examine the structures of defense offices in the War Crimes 
Chamber of the Court for Bosnia and Herzegovina, set up in 
2005, and the newly proposed tribunal for the trial of interna-
tional crimes in Lebanon, approved by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1757, of May 10, 2007. Each of these “hybrid” or 
internationalized tribunals — so-called because of their hybrid 
blend of national and international rules, institutions, and per-
sonnel — have adopted more independent structures for the 
provision of defense counsel than those available in either the 
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) or the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Yet there is little doubt that the issue of equality 
of arms for defense counsel, particularly assigned counsel, will 
continue to be a contentious issue in future international crimi-
nal trials. Virtually all defense counsel in such tribunals have 
been assigned, not retained.
chaRles TayloR’s TRial
At the Taylor trial’s opening session in June, Khan attempted 
to explain Taylor’s absence and his own corresponding duties 
arising from his client’s express wishes. He relied on two lines 
of argument. First, he asserted that although the court had, at 
an earlier pre-trial conference in May, instructed that Taylor 
be able to communicate directly with the Principal Defender 
Vincent Nmehielle about Taylor’s concerns regarding “the 
size and composition of his legal team,”1 that meeting had not 
taken place. Taylor was being held in a Dutch detention facility 
in nearby Scheveningen, a neighborhood of The Hague, while 
the Principal Defender’s headquarters are located in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone, where other trials were under way. Second, Taylor 
himself sent a letter to the court, via his counsel, explaining his 
decision not to appear. The letter states, in relevant part: 
Justice is blind, justice pursues truth, justice is fair, justice 
is immune to politics. It is not justice to preordain convic-
tions or emaciate my defence to the extent that I’m unable 
to launch an effective defence… . Today marks the start 
of the trial against me. The Special Court’s administration 
has been so dilatory that I have only one counsel to appear 
on my behalf, one counsel against a Prosecution team fully 
composed of nine lawyers. This is neither fair nor just… . 
It is therefore with great regret that I must decline to attend 
any further hearings in this case until adequate time and 
facilities are provided for my Defence team. 
* Richard J. Wilson is Professor of Law and founding director of 
the International Human Rights Law Clinic at American University, 
Washington College of Law.
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Charles Taylor, former President of Liberia, arrested in April 2006, has 
been appointed defense counsel by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
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The letter concludes with termination of instructions to 
counsel, a request that counsel “cease to represent me before the 
Special Court.” The court nonetheless ordered Khan to continue 
to represent Taylor, invoking (incorrectly, in the author’s view) 
the court’s Rules and Procedures regarding trial in the absence 
of the accused. Khan correctly invoked the Code of Conduct 
for defense counsel before the Special Court, which makes it 
mandatory for defense counsel not to represent a client if rep-
resentation has been terminated. The court nonetheless insisted 
that Khan’s representation continue, at least by his presence in 
the courtroom, asserting that the “Code of Conduct [could not] 
override a court order.” 
Counsel continued to argue after the court’s order, asserting 
that the issue presented was one of first impression in the law 
of the tribunal which needed to be properly adjudicated, but the 
court was unmoved. The prosecution then began an opening 
statement as Khan gathered his papers and books and stood to 
leave. As he stood, shortly after the prosecutor had commenced 
his statement, the court admonished:
Mr. Khan, you have not been given leave to withdraw. You 
don’t just get up and waltz out of here. You have not been 
permitted to leave . . . . There is a directive of this court 
asking you to sit down and represent your client, which you 
apparently have defied, and now you are walking out with 
further defiance, without leave. 
Khan responded, with great respect for the court “I am no 
longer instructed in this case… . I’m trying not to be diffi-
cult; I’m trying to be principled. Your Honor, I’m privy to the 
instructions of my client.” Khan left the room, pausing at the 
door to state, “Your Honor, I must. I do apologize.” 
The court immediately appointed Duty Counsel Charles 
Jalloh to take over the defense of Taylor through opening state-
ments. Jalloh willingly accepted. There followed a lengthy 
opening statement from the prosecution, which took the rest of 
the morning and much of the afternoon session that day. At the 
close of the day’s proceedings, however, the court again raised 
the issue alluded to in Khan’s morning argument, the inability 
of the accused to speak directly to the Principal Defender. The 
court couched the issue as “the matter of the fair-trial rights of 
the accused, Mr. Taylor, who’s not with us in court today for one 
reason or another.” The court noted, though without reference to 
Khan’s arguments, that Taylor “had expected to speak with the 
Principal Defender” after a prior pre-trial conference. 
After much additional discussion and argument from Jalloh, 
the Court allowed acting Registrar Herman von Hebel to make 
a statement. Von Hebel bluntly stated that he “thought it was 
not necessary” that Taylor meet with the Principal Defender, 
and thus refused to fund the Principal Defender’s travel from 
Freetown to The Hague. Presiding Judge Sebutinde paused a 
moment, then stated wryly, “Well, that definitely sheds some 
light on the reason why we find ourselves in this unhappy situa-
tion.” In a complete shift of direction, the court then found that 
Taylor’s request to meet with the Principal Defender was “a 
reasonable request and falls within his rights to do so. The office 
of the Principal Defender was set up precisely for reasons like 
that.” It ordered the Registrar to facilitate travel by the Principal 
Defender to The Hague to meet with Taylor and adjourned the 
proceedings until the end of June. No further mention was made 
of the contempt threat against Khan, that day or later. 
Taylor’s trial ground to a halt after the prosecution’s opening 
statement. The Principal Defender flew to The Hague and met 
with Taylor in late June. At a hearing on June 25, 2007 to update 
the court on discussions with the accused, the court ordered the 
Principal Defender Vincent Nmehielle to assign new counsel 
to the accused, and further ordered the Registrar to ensure that 
the Principal Defender was able to assign a lead counsel, two 
co-counsel, and one senior investigator. At a brief hearing on 
August 20, 2007, Taylor appeared with his new defense team, 
led by Courtenay Griffiths, a Queen’s Counsel from England, 
and two British co-counsel. During a recent status hearing in 
early December, Griffiths indicated that the defense team now 
totaled eleven members.2 At the request of the defense team, 
Taylor’s trial resumed again on January 7, 2008, more than 
seven months after the prosecution’s opening statement.
lessoNs fRom The TayloR TRial
What are the lessons from this episode and its apparent 
dénouement, as this first trial of an ex-president in Africa 
finally resumed in January 2008? There are several. First, 
Khan’s action in refusing to proceed as Taylor’s counsel, and 
his courageous decision to leave the courtroom despite a court 
order to the contrary, appear quite well founded in law and 
ethics. This is borne out by his proper reliance on the code of 
ethics for counsel before that tribunal, which required him to 
stop all action on his former client’s behalf because his client 
had terminated his services, and because he was “privy” to or 
aware of those instructions. The court also abandoned its strong 
threat of contempt. The judge’s inaction at least implicitly sup-
ported Khan’s decision. Second, the Duty Counsel system of the 
Principal Defender Office provided the court with a convenient 
and effective vehicle to “fill the gap” created by Khan’s absence 
until new counsel could be found. Charles Jalloh, a young and 
capable Sierra Leonean lawyer, handled the situation with poise 
and confidence, stepping in on a moment’s notice, which is 
just what his office was designed to do. Third, the seven month 
delay in the proceedings was attributable almost exclusively to 
the parsimonious actions of the Registrar in refusing to allow 
the Principal Defender a simple round-trip air fare and related 
travel expenses to The Hague to meet with Taylor. The actions 
of the Registrar seem particularly misguided when one consid-
ers the extraordinary costs of moving the entire operation of 
the Special Court from Freetown to The Hague, with scores of 
personnel traveling on the Registrar’s budget for extended stays 
there. Denying a single trip to the Principal Defender appeared 
vindictive and small. 
Fourth, and most important, Taylor’s complaints that his 
defense team was “emaciated” — thin of representation by 
counsel to the point of starvation — and that he was being 
denied the right to adequate time and facilities for preparation 
of his defense, are well-founded. The right to adequate time and 
facilities for the defense to prepare, and adequate resources to 
that end, are cornerstones of the right to a fair trial. The right 
to equality of arms is a deeply established, and particularly apt, 
precept in the European system for protection of human rights, 
and one which has been imported into each of the international 
and hybrid criminal tribunals.3 While that guarantee does not 
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mean dollar-for-dollar parity with prosecution funding, the 
defense must be provided with resources — time, space, library, 
staff, and compensation — sufficient for the task. The actions of 
the court, although not explicitly acknowledging their ground-
ing in the concept of equality of arms, implicitly recognized the 
premise by ultimately ordering significant additional funding for 
the defense, and by Nmehielle’s appointment of a defense team 
more nearly adequate to the challenges posed by the trial of a 
former head of state. 
Again, the court’s action seems to take place over the stead-
fast resistance of the Registrar, who had not adequately funded 
the defense for trial until the court ordered it to do so. The 
principle running through each of these last two observations, 
a principle about the role of appointed defense counsel in any 
tribunal, national or international, is that a structure for the pro-
vision of defense services that relies on the Registry of the court 
for its funding or decision-making approval is hamstrung from 
the outset and lacks that fundamental independence that is the 
hallmark of an effective defense operation. The defense units in 
the ICTY, ICTR and ICC are all situated within the Registry, 
and selection and coordination of defense counsel are functions 
of Registry personnel.4 
This is not to suggest that the Office of the Principal Defender 
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone is not “a step in the right 
direction,” as one of the most recent and most comprehensive 
reports on that office has found.5 As that and other studies have 
pointed out, the Defense Office system brings a number of 
important innovations to the organization of defense services in 
internationalized criminal tribunals. 
The imPoRTaNce of The defeNse office
Notably, there was no mention of the defense office in 
the original agreement between Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations (UN) setting up the Special Court. The office came 
into being as a result of an agreement between the Registrar 
and the court’s then-President, Justice Geoffrey Robertson. The 
concept of a separate Defense Office grew and evolved, and 
the office is recognized widely as “novel,” “innovative,” and 
“unique.”6 It includes some separation from the Registry, in that 
the Principal Defender selects lawyers to be placed on the list 
for assignment to the accused, and also hires the in-house staff 
of Duty Counsel, who perform duties similar to that of Jalloh in 
any of the cases before the court, particularly during the crucial 
initial stages when an accused is without formally assigned 
counsel and needs advice for initial appearance and other early 
decisions. In addition, the office performs a number of roles in 
administration, training, legal research, drafting assistance, and 
outreach that none of the other defense structures offered until 
this innovation. 
cRimiNal defeNse aT The BosNiaN WaR  
cRimes chamBeR
In some ways, the work of the defense office in Sierra 
Leone parallels the work of the Criminal Defense Section of 
the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The WCC came into being in 2005 as a result of 
the actions of the High Representative, an official position cre-
ated under the Dayton Peace Agreement, as part of an overhaul 
of the national justice system to allow it to try war crimes and 
other international offenses in the local courts or by transfer 
from the ICTY. This structure brings the WCC within the ambit 
of other internationalized or hybrid courts.7 
The Criminal Defense Section is known by its Bosnian acro-
nym OKO (Odsjek Krivič  ne Odbrane). The OKO has a director 
with a professional staff, a nd like its counterpart in Sierra Leone, 
it is the licensing authority for attorneys who wish to obtain an 
appointment before the WCC. It provides legal and administra-
tive support to defendants and advocates. For the defendant, this 
can be as basic as advice on how to select a qualified defense 
counsel, while for defense counsel, the office provides advice 
and assistance in preparing submission of legal arguments, as 
well as training courses on defense issues.8 The OKO is part of 
the administrative structure of the court’s Registry; the director 
of the office is selected by the Registrar and raises money for 
the OKO.9 
The NecessiTy of iNdePeNdeNT defeNse offices
Independence is the key element that is lacking in both the 
OKO and the Defense Office in Sierra Leone. When asked 
to specifically rule on that issue, the Sierra Leone Appeals 
Chamber made clear in Prosecutor v. Brima et al., that “the 
Defence Office is not an independent organ of the Special Court, 
as Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry 
are,” and that the office is under the administrative authority 
of the Registry.10 This lack of independence led the authors 
of the War Crimes Studies Center report to offer, as their first 
recommendation, that any future tribunal should “include the 
establishment of an Independent Defence Office in the Statute 
of the Tribunal.”11
That is exactly what the newest internationalized tribunal 
does. Perhaps taking heed of prior experience, and just before 
his retirement, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the 
establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon in December 
of 2006.12 When the Lebanese government could not reach 
agreement on the structure of a tribunal, the Secretary-General 
stepped in. For the first time, he proposed a tribunal of four 
separate and independent organs: chambers (judges), the pros-
ecutor, the registry, and the defense office. The head of the 



















Taylor’s trial has raised issues about the adequacy of defense before 
international criminal tribunals.
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the office would be financed through the budget for the tribunal. 
“The need for a defence office to protect the rights of suspects 
and accused,” says the Secretary-General’s report, “has evolved 
in the practice of the UN-based tribunals as part of the need to 
ensure ‘equality of arms.’”13 
On May 30, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1757, establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, by a vote 
of 10-0, with five abstentions (China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russian 
Federation, and South Africa).14 Debate on the resolution does 
not reveal a single question about an independent defense office. 
The resolution follows the recommendation of the Secretary-
General. Article 13 of the Statute for the Tribunal creates, for 
the first time in UN history, an independent Defence Office, 
whose director is to be appointed by the Secretary-General, 
in consultation with the President of the Tribunal. The same 
provision states that the Defence Office “may also include one 
or more public defenders,” and will provide services similar to 
those of the OKO in Bosnia and the Defence Office in Sierra 
Leone.15 Should the Special Tribunal for Lebanon come into 
being, the Defence Office will provide a model and precedent 
for national and international justice. Such an office provides an 
apt model for amendment of the Rome Statute of the ICC during 
the review conference of States Parties in 2009.
coNclusioN
from the very start of their operation, international 
criminal tribunals have struggled with issues regarding the 
independence of defense lawyers. In the Nuremberg trials and 
subsequent proceedings, defense counsel complained that there 
was not equality of arms between the prosecution and defense. 
The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
have struggled with structural issues in the provision of defense 
services, including fee-splitting between counsel and clients 
and other embarrassing ethical lapses by defense counsel. The 
UN has shown foresight and common sense in moving away 
from a defense office that works under the thumb of the registry 
and toward a truly independent structure for defense services, 
a structure that is, because of defense counsel’s true indepen-
dence, more likely to assure fair proceedings and carefully 
reasoned, sound outcomes. The system of international criminal 
justice deserves no less. HRB
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